Introduction
Over the past half dozen years, a significant body of theory and experience in concurrent program verification has emerged [5, 9, 111 . We have learned that even the simplest concurrent algorithms can have subtle timing-dependent errors, which are very hard to discover by testing. We can have little confidence in such an algorithm without a careful proof of its correctness.
Most computer scientists find it natural to reason about a concurrent program in terms of its behavior -the sequence of events generated by its execution.
Experience has taught us that such reasoning is not reliable; we have seen too many convincing proofs of incorrect algorithms. This has led to assertional proof methods, in which one reasons about the program's state instead of its behavior. Unlike behavioral reasoning, assertional proofs can be formalized -i.e., reduced to a series of precise steps that can, in principle, be machine-verified. Because assertional methods involve reasoning about the global program state, there is a wide-spread belief that they are not suitable for distributed programsa belief that has been encouraged by our own prior work [4] . In this paper, we refute that belief by showing that ordinary assertional methods, developed for nondistributed concurrent programs, work well for distributed programs. We give an assertional correctness proof of an algorithm, due to Tajibnapis [12] , that maintains message-routing tables for a network in which communication links can fail and be repaired. Although we recommend reading [12] for comparison, our presentation is self-contained.
The algorithm is described in Section 2, and an informal correctness proof is given in Section 3. Section 4 considers the problem of writing a formal proof, and one such proof is sketched in the Appendix.
In the Conclusion, we discuss why assertional methods work for distributed programs.
Informal development of the algorithm
We assume a network of computers communicating over two-way transmission lines. We wish to devise a routing algorithm by which each computer can send messages to any other computer in the network, and each message travels over the smallest possible number of transmission lines. As an example, consider the network of Fig. 1 . Messages sent by computer B to computer E should go via computer C, not via A and D. As we see, the network of computers can be represented by a graph in which each computer is a vertex and each transmission line is an edge. We must route messages along minimal-length paths, where the length of a path is the number of edges it contains.
Let 6(b, c) denote the distance between vertices b and c -i.e., the length of the shortest path joining them, or co if there is no such path, with 6(b, 6) defined to be 0. We say that two vertices are neighbors if they are joined by an edge, so the distance between them is 1. It is easy to see that if each computer x uses the following algorithm for relaying a message with destination y, then messages are always routed along a minimal length path. ifx=y then accept message elseifS(x,y)=co then message undeliverable else send message to a neighbor p with the smallest value of S(p, y) fi fi In the network of Fig. 1 , B would send a message destined for E to C rather than to A because S(C, E) = 1 and S(A, E) = 2. The optimal routing of messages is therefore easy if each computer has the following information:
-Its distance to every other computer;
-Who its neighbors are; -The distance from each of its neighbors to every other computer. For now, we assume that a computer knows who its neighbors are, and consider the problem of computing the distances. Suppose dist is any function satisfying the following relation for all vertices b and c, where 1 + 00 is defined to equal co: It is easy to show that this implies dist(b, c) = S(b, c) for all b and c. This observation suggests the following iterative procedure for computing the distances, where assignment and equality of arrays is defined in the obvious way, and the for all statement is similar to a for statement, except that the different 'iterations' may be performed in any order -or concurrently. To overcome this difficulty, we observe that if NN is the number of vertices in the graph, then the distance between any two points is either less than NN or else equals 00. This means that if dist satisfies the following relation for all b and c: 
It is not hard to show that this program always terminates in at most NN iterations for any initial values of dist, and that it terminates with dist(b, c) = S(b, c) for all b and c. The proof involves observing that after the kth iteration, dist(b, c) = 6(b, c) for all b and c such that S(b, c) < k.
If the reader does not understand this algorithm, we advise him to apply it to the graph of Fig. 1 , using arbitrary initial values, before proceeding.
We now transform this algorithm into a distributed one, in which each computer calculates its distance to every other computer -computer b calculating the array of values dist (b, -) . Each value oZddist(p, c) is used by every neighbor b of p in computing dist (b, c) . In a distributed algorithm, these neighbors need their own copies of this value. We therefore introduce a new array dtub such that dtab (6, This can be regarded as a distributed algorithm, where every computer executes a separate 'iteration' of each "for all 6" statement.
Moreover, computer b finishes with dtub(b, p, -) = dist(p, -) for every neighbor p, so the arrays dist and dtub (b, -, -) contain precisely the information b needs for routing messages. Unfortunately, this is a synchronous algorithm -every computer must finish executing its iteration of the first "for all 6" statement before any computer can begin its iteration of the next one, and the termination condition is a global one that an individual computer cannot evaluate by itself. Such a synchronous algorithm is not well-suited for a network of independent computers. In this synchronous algorithm, each computer b repeatedly cycles through the following two steps:
(1) For every neighbor p: put each value dist(b, c) into p's array element
To turn it into an asynchronous algorithm, we make the following changes: -Instead of putting the value dist(b, c) directly into dtub(p, b, c), b will send it to computer p, and p will put it into the dtub array; -We reverse the order of the two steps. Since b repeatedly cycles through them, we can do this by simply executing the (original) first step before beginning the cycle. We then have a program in which b first sends all its values dist(b, -) to each of its neighbors, then cycles through the two steps:
(1) Compute the elements of dist(b, -); (2) Send their values to its neighbors.
-If the value of dist(b, c) is not changed by the first step of this cycle, then there is no reason to send it in the second step. Thus, b will send its neighbors only the values of dist(b, -) that have changed.
-Computer b will execute this cycle whenever it receives a new value for dtub (b, p, c) . Since a change in the distance from p to c cannot affect the distance from b to any computer other than c, b need recompute only the single element dist(b, c) when it receives this new value.
We then obtain an asynchronous algorithm in which each computer b does the following: Computing the distances requires that computers be able to determine who their current neighbors are. We assume that a computer is notified when any of its communication lines fails or is repaired. How this is done will not concern us. We require only that the following conditions be satisfied:
(1) Notifications of failures and repairs of any single communication line are received in the same order that the failures and repairs occur;
(2) Notification of a failure is received after the receipt of any message sent over the line before it failed; (3) Notification of a repair is received before the receipt of any message sent over the line after it was repaired.
The failure of a line may result in the loss of messages that were in transit at the time of the failure, and of messages sent after the failure. Requirement (2) applies only to those messages that are not lost. A failure may cause the complete loss of a message, but we assume that it cannot garble a message. Any message that is delivered must be the same message that was sent.
We can modify our algorithm to handle failures and repairs by adding a new array nbrs This completes our informal description of the algorithm. Although differing in many details, it is basically the same as the algorithm given in [12] , described with about the same degree of imprecision.
There are two shortcomings of the algorithm that should be noted.
-The value of NN -or at least an upper bound for its value -must be known in advance; -A computer b does not know when the algorithm has terminated and its distance table dist(6, -) is correct. Other methods, such as the one in [2] must be used to discover this.
Before we can write a rigorous proof of its correctness, we will need a more precise statement of the algorithm. However, our informal description will suffice for the informal proof presented in the next section.
An informal correctness proof
We will prove the following property of the algorithm, which is essentially the same property proved in [12] To prove this property, we prove the following two properties, where the system is said to be stable if there are no unprocessed failure or repair notifications and no "dist(b, c)" messages in transit.
Cl. If the system is stable, then the values of disc and drab are correct. C2. In the absence of failures and repairs, the system will eventually become stable.
These two properties are proved separately.
Proof of property Cl
Property Cl is a safety property -one which asserts that some predicate 9' is always true. (A predicate is a boolean-valued function of the system state.) Such a safety property is proved by finding a predicate 9 with the following properties: Sl. 9 is true initially.
S2. Each action of the system leaves 9 true.
S3. 4 implies 9'.
A predicate satisfying condition 2 is called an invariant of the system. For a general discussion of this method, we refer the reader to [6] or [ll] .
In the proof of Cl, 9" is the assertion that if the system is stable then the values of dist and dtub are correct. Recalling
(1) and (2) of Section 2, it is easy to see that this is equivalent to: 
This expression for B is convenient because the algorithm always recomputes the elements of dist so as to keep condition Pi true. To satisfy condition S3 -the only condition that mentions 9 -the invariant 4; must imply that CPi and 92 are satisfied when the system is stable.
The invariant 9 will be a conjunction CP1 A -a2, where LP1 is defined in Eq. (3), and _P2 implies that P2 holds when the system is stable. We want 9* to assert that dtub will have the correct value when all outstanding "dist" messages and all failure and repair notification have been processed. However, $2 must be a predicate -a function of the current state of the system -so we have to translate the assertion "will have . . . when . . ." into an assertion about the current state.
In order to formulate the predicate 92, we must state more precisely our We now derive a predicate which expresses the assertion that drab will have the correct value when all outstanding messages and notifications have been processed. We first define a predicate "II(b, p) which states that dtab(b, p, p) will have the correct value when b has finished processing all repair and failure notifications in IQ@, 6). Finally, we must prove condition S2 -the invariance of 9. This involves showing that if 4 is true, then any action of the system leaves $ true. We have already observed that all system actions leave P1 true, so we must show that they also leave -a2 true. We do this by showing separately that each Q(b, p) and %(b, p, c)
is invariant. From its definition, we see that the only actions which affect the truth value of any part of Q( (6, -Computer b processes a repair notification: The only case in which this could change the truth value of % (6, p) is if the line is working and this is the last notification in IQ(p, 6). In this case, 1A must have been true before processing the notification, which ensures that ZB will be true afterwards. IQ(b, p) . However, the action causes p to send b a "dist(p, c)" message, making condition 1A true in this case. This completes the proof of the invariance of 9, which finishes the proof of property Cl.
Proof of property C2
Property C2 is a liveness property -one which asserts that some predicate 9 is eventually true. In our case, Y is the predicate that is true when the system is stable -i.e., when there are no unprocessed notifications or "dist(p, c)" messages. The traditional method of proving such a property is to find a nonnegative integervalued function V of the system state such that if 9 is not true, then the value of V will eventually decrease.
Since a nonnegative integral function cannot keep decreasing foreover, this implies that 9' must eventually become true. Instead of choosing V to have integer values, we can let its range be any set W with a well-founded total order relation t, where an order relation is well-founded if there is no infinite decreasing chain WlZW2>.
. . . To prove C2, we show that in the absence of failures or repairs, if the system is not stable then the NN + l-tuple V must keep decreasing.
A common choice of
The value of V can be affected only by the failure or repair of communication lines, and the processing of "dist" messages and failure or repair notifications. Since we are assuming that there are no further failures or repairs, we need only consider the latter three events. We show that each of them decreases V.
Since processing a failure or repair notification decreases the first (left-most) element of V, this obviously decreases its value. We therefore have only to consider the action of a computer b processing a "dist(p, c)" message, which involves the following three steps:
(1) Remove the message from the input queue IQ(p, b).
(2) Set d& (6, p, c) equal to its value, and recompute
If the value of dist(b, c) has changed, then send its new value to all the neighbors. Let i be the value that the message gives for dist(p, c), let j be the original value of d& (6, c) and let j' be its new value. These three actions affect the value of V in the following ways:
(1) Decreases m(i) by one.
) and m(j'). We consider separately the following three cases: j'= j: In this case, the only effect is to decrease m(i), which decreases V. j'> j: In this case, the component of V that is increased -the j'-component -lies to the right of a component that is being decreased -namely, the j-component.
Hence, V is decreased. j' <j: In this case, processing the message decreases the value of disr (b, c) . This can only happen if the valne i that is received is smaller than any of the other elements in dtub(6, -, c), so j'= i + 1. Hence, it is only the i + l-component that is increased while the i-component is decreased, so V is decreased.
We thus showed that as long as there are no more failures or repairs, if there is an unprocessed failure or repair notification or "dist" message, then processing it will decrease the NN + 1-tuple V. This implies that in the absence of failures and repairs, the system must eventually reach a stable state, completing the proof of property C2, which completes our informal correctness proof of the algorithm.
Formalizing the proof
The informal proof in Section 3 is really a proof for a program in which the processing of a message or notification -removing it from the input queue, recomputing drab and dist, and putting the appropriate "dist(b, c)" messages on output queues -is an indivisible atomic operation. It is easy to write such a program in a concurrent programming language and translate our informal proof into a formal one for that program. However, a real implementation is not likely to use such large atomic operations; for example, it probably could send only one message with a single operation.
We would then be left with the question of whether we had proved anything about a real implementation.
One approach is to prove the correctness of our coarse-grained program -the one with very large atomic operations -and then show that a real implementation is equivalent to it, where two programs are considered equivalent if for every execution of one there is an equivalent execution of the other. There are two problems with this approach: -It assumes that we know what it means for two executions to be equivalent. Although there are formal definitions of this concept, they leave open the question of whether two 'equivalent' programs really are equivalent when used as components in a larger system. -There are no well-developed formal methods for proving the equivalence of two very different realizations of an algorithm. We therefore consider other approaches.
Medium-grained programs
The most obvious approach is to prove the correctness of the program that is actually being run on the computer. There are two reasons why one may not want to do this.: _ Real programs have very small atomic operations -typically operations on single memory words -and assertional proofs of such fine-grained programs involve a great deal of uninteresting detail;
-We may be interested in verifying the algorithm, not a particular implementation of it.
This suggests representing the algorithm with a medium-grained program -one whose atomic operations are small enough so we feel confident that it accurately represents a real implementation, yet large enough so the proof is not too complex. This is the approach we have taken.
4.1.1.

Our program
In
by having the input and output queues be shared variables. The operations of inserting and removing an element from a shared queue are taken to be atomic. In our implementation, we have made the atomic operations as large as possible subject to the constraint that each atomic operation perform at most one access to a shared variable. It is well known that by observing this constraint, one can transform a program into an equivalent (in the sense described above) coarser-grained one [lo] . As we remarked above, the proof of Section 3 may be regarded as the correctness proof of a coarse-grained program in which a node processes a single message or notification as one atomic operation. The value of IQ'(p, 6) changes at the same time as the internal state of the arc, and %! (b, p) becomes an invariant of the finer-grained program when it is defined in terms of IQ'(p, b) and 1Q'(b, p) instead of IQ(p, 6) and IQ(6, p).
We use the same trick for 93 (6, p, c). Its invariance for the coarse-grained program rests upon node b's changing dtub and dist, and putting messages on its output queues, all in a single atomic action. To achieve this in the finer-grained program, we define a state function QQ'(b, p) that is the same as OQ(6, p), except that it is changed by the same atomic operation that changes dtab and dist -being changed to the value that QQ(b, p) will have when the node finishes sending its messages.
We then let Q'(p, 6) be the concatenation of IQ'(p, b), TQ(p, b) and OQ'(p, b)
, and define 3 (6, p, c) in terms of IQ'@, p) and Q'(p, 6) to obtain an invariant for the finer-grained program. The formal definitions of these 'primed' state functions are given in the Appendix. They require the use of predicates that explicitly mention a process's control state -i.e., the value of its 'program counter'. Some computer scientists have objected to the explicit use of control states in the assertions; they want assertions to mention only program variables. We do not understand these objections, since the control state is just as much part of a program's state as the values of its variables. Indeed, every programmer knows that variables can often be eliminated by encoding their values in the control state, and that control structure can often be simplified by adding extra variables. Moreover, it is well-known that one cannot verify concurrent programs without reasoning about their control state [lo] .
To avoid mentioning the control state, one must introduce 'dummy variables' -program variables used only to encode the control state. The easiest way to do this for our program is probably to introduce IQ'(b,p) and OQ'(b,p) as dummy variables. We find it inelegant to add extra variables to the program just for the proof -especially, as in this case, when the values of these dummy variables can so easily be defined as functions of the real program state.
Other programming languages
It has become fashionable to eschew the use of shared variables and adopt programming languages in which interprocess communication is performed only through value-passing communication primitives, as in CSP [3] . It is argued that this more restricted form of communication will make it easier to reason about programs, simplifying their proofs. While there may be valid reasons for preferring these languages, simplifying correctness proofs is not one of them. The structure of a proof is determined by the underlying algorithm, not the language in which the algorithm is described. It is easy to express our algorithm in CSP, using the '!' and '?' operations to effect the communication between the nodes and the arcs. We can then just as easily translate our proof into a proof of the new program, essentially by changing the definitions of the state functions 1Q'(6, p) and OC?'(6, p).
For the kind of reasoning sketched in the Appendix, the details of the programming language make little difference to the proof. We used shared variables because the formal proof methods for them are better-known than the corresponding ones for other communication primitives.
The mechanization of a proof may be harder in some languages than in others, but this is due to lower-level issues like whether 'aliasing' of variable names can be detected at compile time, not to the interprocess communication mechanism.
Other medium-grained programs
In the Appendix, we tried to represent the algorithm with the most general program in which adding or removing a message or notification from a queue is an atomic operation.
We believe that any other implementation with the same granularity can be regarded as a special case of ours, in the sense that any execution of it corresponds to a possible execution of ours. For example, a program in which each node has a single input queue, with each message and notification identifying its source, can be viewed as a particular implementation of our program in which each IQ(p, b) is stored as a subqueue of the single input queue. If a program is a special case of ours, then its proof will be a special case of our proof. More precisely, the correspondence between the two programs can be used to transform our proof into a proof of the other program. For example, for a program with a single input queue, references to the variable IQ(p, b) will be replaced by the state function whose value is the subqueue of the input queue containing all messages and notifications from the arc joining b with p.
Fine-grained programs
Despite the complexity of verifying a real implementation, with its many atomic operations, formal verification is the only way to guarantee the correctness of a concurrent program. Unverified programs tend to have subtle, timing-dependent errors that are unlikely to be discovered by testing.
If the program uses essentially the same algorithm, then our proof can be modified to prove its correctness.
The modification involves the same technique used to go from the proof of the coarse-grained program in Section 3 to the proof of the medium-grained program in the Appendix -replacing variables by state functions.
However, the many small atomic operations of a real program, and the corresponding large number of different control states, make this a complex task, and the proof should be checked by computer to avoid errors. 
Abstract specifications
Instead of verifying a particular program, one would probably prefer to prove the correctness of an abstract specification of the algorithm. Any particular program would then be verified by showing that it is a correct implementation of the specification.
A general method for doing this is discussed in [7] . In this method, a specification has the form "there exist state functions fi , f2, . . . such that . . .", using temporal logic assertions to describe how the state functions f, change. To specify our algorithm, the queues and distance tables would be state functions instead of program variables, and we would write temporal logic assertions instead of a program to describe how they change. However, the specification and correctness proof for our algorithm would look very similar to the program and proof sketched in the Appendix.
Proving that a program meets such a specihcation requires defining the state functions of the specification as state functions of the program -i.e., as functions of variables and 'program counters'. This is essentially the same as replacing the variables of a coarser-grained program by state functions of a finer-grained one. The specification method can be viewed as a formal method for showing that a fine-grained description of an algorithm correctly implements a coarse-grained description.
By writing temporal logic assertions instead of programs, one avoids the difficulties encountered in trying to prove the equivalence of two programs.
Conclusion
Finding an assertional proof requires transforming our ordinary reasoning about how the program behaves into assertional reasoning about why the program state ensures the correct behavior. We have found that this can be difficult, but when it is done, the assertional proof almost always turns out to be easier to understand than the behavioral reasoning. Moreover, the assertional proof can be reduced to a series of formal logical steps, which is not true of ordinary behavioral proofs.
In this paper, we have presented one more example confirming our experience with assertional proofs. In Section 3 we gave an informal assertional proof that we feel is easier to understand, and at least as rigorous, as the behavioral proof in [12] . We then discussed various ways of formalizing the proof, one of which is developed in the Appendix.
There would be little point to a paper that simply confirms the virtues of ordinary assertional proofs, which by now should be well-known, except that the algorithm we have considered is a distributed one. The verification method we have used was developed for nondistributed programs communicating via shared variables, and there is a wide-spread belief that other methods are needed for distributed programs. This belief seems to rest upon three ideas: -The method requires that the communication medium be represented by one or more processes. It is felt that there should be a more efficient method to describe interprocess communication. -The method is based on the concept of a global state -a snapshot of the entire system at a single instant of time. We showed in [4] that there is no invariant method of defining a global state in a distributed system; any way of doing it involves an arbitrary choice. It is felt that a proof method should not be founded upon such a noninvariant concept. -The method involves reasoning about the entire network of processes at once. It is felt that the distributed structure should be reflected in the proof method. These objections originally convinced us that assertional proofs should not work for distributed algorithms.
Our mind was changed only by attempting to prove the correctness of this algorithm. We now consider why these objections are not valid.
Representing the communication medium by separate processes turns out to be an advantage instead of a drawback, because it forces one to specify precisely the interprocess communication mechanism. In our algorithm, the precise specification of the communication lines, and how they fail and are repaired, is crucial. The description given in [12] is somewhat vague, and there is at least one ambiguity that could lead to an incorrect implementation.
Any proof method that simplifies the specification of interprocess communication -for example, by assuming message queues -at best provides only a set of predefined state functions for the user's convenience, and at worst can limit the type of interprocess communication mechanism that it will handle. We doubt that there is any better way to specify the behavior of the communication lines in our algorithm than by describing each line as a process. (Of course, there are better ways to specify a process than by writing a program [7] .)
The objection to the method because of its use of global states is a more profound one, and deserves a careful response -especially since we must assume some responsibility for it. One answer comes from an analogy with physics. Special relativity teaches that the way spacetime is split into space and time coordinates depends upon the observer, and is not invariant. Yet, one must choose space and time coordinates to perform numerical calculations. This causes no problem, since the results of a calculation do not depend upon the choice of coordinates.
Similarly, the validity of an assertional correctness proof does not depend upon how one defines the global state, so one is free to choose an arbitrary definition.
This argument can be made more precise. Choosing a global state is the same as choosing a particular way of interleaving the atomic actions of the different processes into a single execution sequence.
For a temporal logic assertion to be provable, it must be true for all possible program executions, and in particular, it must be true for all the possible interleavings obtained from any real execution. Our proofs are invariant because they involve an implicit quantification over all ways of defining the global state.
The final objection, that the proof method does not reflect the distributed structure, is one that has been advanced in support of assertional methods especially designed for distributed systems. It results from a confusion between distribution and modularity.
The benefits of modularity are well established, and it is felt that the decomposition of a distributed system into separate processes should also provide a decomposition into separate modules. However, modularity should reflect the decomposition into logically separate areas of concern. Components that logically are intimately related should be part of the same module, even if they are physically remote from one another.
We have considered one module in a message-passing system -the module that maintains the routing tables. This module is implemented with one process at each site. There may be other modules that are implemented at a single site -e.g., an archive facility implemented with a very large data storage device on one of the computers.
There are advantages to implementing a single system function at a single site, so the modular decomposition of the system will tend to reflect its physical distribution.
However, a distributed system will also contain modules that are implemented at several sites, and are responsible for maintaining some form of consistency among those sites.
A distributed algorithm is not designed by specifying each process separately, and hoping they work properly when they are plugged together. The design of a distributed algorithm requires reasoning about all the processes together, and it is this global reasoning that is reflected in assertions about the global state. These arguments for and against the use of global reasoning are philosophical ones. When philosophy and observation conflict, it is philosophy that must be revised. Our strongest argument for the use of global assertional reasoning about distributed programs is the example that we have presented.
Appendix. A formal proof
We now sketch a formal proof for a particular realization of our algorithm as a multiprocess program. We first describe the program, then give the proof.
A. 1. The program
The execution of a multiprocess program is formally specified as an interleaving of the atomic actions of the individual processes. The state of the program, consisting of the values of all variables and of the 'program counters' of all processes, is defined before and after each atomic action.
An atomic operation is a portion of a process's program whose execution is an atomic action. When writing a multiprocess program, one must indicate what the atomic operations are. We do this by enclosing atomic operations in angle brackets. Thus, execution of the statement
if (6) then (S) else (T)
consists of two atomic actions: 1. evaluation of the boolean condition b, 2. execution of either S or T. We will not bother to formally define a programming language; instead, we use simple language constructs that are easy to understand. However, we do need a few unusual language features that require an explanation. _ We let '?' denote a boolean condition that nondeterministically has the value true or false. Thus, if (?) then S else T is a statement that nondeterministically chooses to execute either S or T. -We use an iff . . . ffi statement that is the same as Dijkstra's if . . . fi described in [l] , except that if none of the guards is true then the statement is equivalent to a skip. (In Dijkstra's command, an if with all guards false is an abort). Note that there is nondeterminism when more than one guard is true. We use it with angle brackets around each guarded command, indicating that the evaluation of the guard and, if it is true, the execution of the following statement list, is a single atomic action. Our program will use the following object types:
distance : a nonnegative integer or 03. node :
an integer from 1 through NN. message :
an ordered pair (distance (message), node (message)), where distance(message) is of type distance and node(message) is of type node.
It represents
a message stating that the distance from the sender to node (message) is distance (message). notification : a type consisting of the two values "fail" and "repair". queue :
a sequence of elements.
The following functions are defined on queues, where c5 denotes the empty queue: head(q): The first element in the queue q -undefined if q = 4; tail(q) : The sequence of all elements in q except the first, also undefined if q = 4 ; q "ql:
The concatenation of queues q and q'. If q #c$, then head(q 0 q') = head(q). These are the same queues that were described in our informal proof. The queue TQ(p, 6) is a variable local to arc{b, p}. We assume that the following two operations are atomic: -Adding an element to a queue; -Testing if a queue is empty, and removing its head if it is not.
We first give the program for arcjb, p}. It has the following local variables: of type message or notification. It is used to hold the message or notification currently being processed.
Note that unlike S and send, we do not subscript the variables p, q, c and next, using the same variable names for all nodes b. We do not need to distinguish between different instances of these variables because they are not mentioned in the proof. In Section 4, we discussed the general approach to proving the correctness of our program. We have to define state functions IQ '(p, 6) and OQ '(p, b) that change at the right time to maintain the invariance of Q (b, p) and 23 (6, p, c 6) then IQ(p, 6) was not needed for the coarser-grained one. Recall that S(b) holds the names of the input queues that node b finds to be nonempty.
We must state the obvious assertion that when control is at pr(b), after b has computed S(b) but before it has used it, these queues are still nonempty. We therefore define the follo&ng predicate:
We then have the following invariant: We also specify the initial condition as follows: Finally, we define the following predicate, to be used in stating the correctness condition, which asserts that no arc is in the process of failing or being repaired: The correctness condition for our algorithm is stated formally using temporal logic. A temporal logic formula may be thought of informally as an assertion about some specific time during the program execution. A predicate is a temporal assertion about the state at the current time. More general temporal assertions are formed with the unary operators 0 and 0, which have the following interpretations for any assertion A : 0 A: the assertion A is true now and at all times in the future; 0 A: the assertion A is true now or at some time in the future. A formal definition of this temporal logic can be found in [6] or [ll] . We note here that •i A = ~0 1A for any assertion A. (We are thus using the 'linear time' logic of [6] .) Our correctness condition, that all computers eventually obtain the correct values of dist if lines stop failing and being repaired, is expressed formally by the assertion init = q ((U no.arc.change) 3 0 q l( p1 A pz)).
(4)
The formal proof of this assertion follows the lines of our informal proof. First, we restate correctness conditions Cl and C2 formally as follows:
Cl 3 init ~09 C2 = init ~O(U no.arc.change 2 0 0 stable).
It is a simple exercise in temporal logic to show that Cl and C2 imply (4) . To verify Cl, we prove the following three assertions:
Sl. init s2. 4104 S3. 419.
Verifying Sl and S3 are simple exercises in logical deduction. The heart of the proof involves verifying S2, which asserts the invariance of 4. We now sketch the general approach to proving such an invariance property.
For any program n and any predicate 9, we define t{$}L7{.JJ} to mean the following:
Executing any single atomic operation of program 17 starting from a state in which 4 is true results in a state in which 9 is true.
In [5] , we present a method for deriving such properties of a concurrent program 17 from similar properties of the components of 17. It is a generalization of the standard Hoare method for sequential programs, and can be viewed as a reformulation and generalization of the 'Gries-Owicki' method for concurrent programs [9] . (The Hoare method corresponds to the case where 17 is a single atomic operation.)
To go from such a generalized Hoare logic assertion to a temporal logic assertion, we need the following inference rule: if F{.9}ZI{9} holds, where II is the entire program then4 109.
To prove S2, we must prove k{$}Z7{3}, where L7 is our multiprocess program.
This involves proving the following for each atomic operation s : (S) of 17:
t-{at s A 9}(S){ufter s A 4).
Except for the presence of "at, in and after" predicates, this is an ordinary Hoare-style assertion, and is proved by the same methods as for sequential pro- Condition C2 is a liveness property. Proving such a property usually requires making some assumption about fairness -that the interleaving of the operations from different processes is performed fairly, with no process ever omitted forever. For our algorithm, we must assume that the scheduling of the node and arc processes is fair. (This is a perfectly natural assumption, since we are interested in the case The question of fairness arises whenever there is nondeterminism. Each of our processes makes seemingly important nondeterministic choices -in node(b), the choice of element from S(b); in arc{b,p}, the choice of which queue to take a message from. The correctness of the program does not require any fairness in these choices. Thus, node(b) is free to ignore an individual input queue so long as there is any other nonempty input queue; arc{b, p} can choose to ignore messages sent from b to p so long as there are messages going from p to b.
Having proved Cl, to prove C2 it suffices to prove q (9 A no.arc.change) = 0 0 stable.
It is easy to prove the safety property q (9 A no.urc.chunge A stable) 2 q stable, which states that in the absence of failures and repairs, once the system reaches a stable state, it will remain in it. Hence, to prove assertion (5), it suffices to prove q (9 A no.urc.change)wstable, (6) where the temporal relation -, pronounced "leads to", is defined by
A-B = q (A 30 B).
The "counting down" argument of our informal proof is formalized as follows. We find a state function V having values in a set with a well-founded order relation < such that for any constant Vo: [0(.9 A no.urc 
.chunge) A V = Vo]-[stable v V < VJ. (7)
Temporal logic reasoning shows that (7) Assertion (7) is proved by the method sketched in Section 3. The method for translating from that informal proof into a formal temporal logic proof is described in [ll] .
